It should be clear by now that we live in post-apocalyptic times. From the outset, the discipline of Sociology was created to deflect us from thinking apocalyptically, because it could not be supported by the modern nation-state if it engaged in either eschatology or scatology. Instead, it had to assume the natural logic of Staatsräson as being completely aligned with Enlightenment idealism. The very possibility that the Enlightenment could engender the opposite of what it claims—barbarism instead of civilization, arbitrariness instead of universal reason, force instead of legitimacy—was never taken seriously. For example, despite the fact that “liberal democracy” engendered fascism, we are still indoctrinated to believe the two are mutually exclusive. And despite the fact that reason engenders neurosis, we are still taught that neurosis is unreasonable.
Dialectics—even if understood as a mere thought experiment—has never been a strong point within mainstream Sociology, because it defies the neat juxtaposition of structural essences linked to functional necessities, and phenomenal appearances linked to experiential and/or hermeneutic contingencies. Most of mainstream Sociology could be classified as a very impoverished application of transcendental idealism. The most notable exception, Historical Materialism, has only been acknowledged within mainstream Sociology when annotations are attached that emphasize its political-ideological ethos rather than its scientific underpinnings.
In Germany, the country where I live and work, being aligned with Marxism or Communism is considered to contradict the constitutional anchoring and democratic nature of the Federal Republic. This has led to people with left-leaning sympathies being rejected for official functions, whereas those with right-leaning sympathies—including, quite frequently, extremist ones—are not. This is in line with the rehabilitation of many former members of the administration of the Third Reich (including those with overt Nazi sympathies) into the newly founded FRG. This was because they were considered instrumental in the fight against Communism during the Cold War.
For Sociology to become relevant—perhaps for the first time in a long time—it needs to acknowledge the possibility that it has been wrong from the outset because of its innate Kantian-Hegelian roots. At the same time, it needs to acknowledge that it cannot simply adopt a Marxist program as if Leninism, Stalinism, and Trotskyism had never been its products. A starting point might be to accept the post-apocalyptic condition: the Establishment of Enlightenment—regardless of the name it carries—has failed, either because it was a lie from the outset or because of its internal contradictions. For Sociology, it does not really matter why the Establishment of Enlightenment has collapsed. What matters instead are its consequences.
The first thing any serious sociological approach should abandon is the assumption that the language of the Establishment is an adequate tool for understanding the practices that form the estate. Of course, it has to be taken into account—not as representational but as performative. Political, legal, ideological, and economic discourses of the Establishment are tools that shape the Establishment. They should not be confused with practicing the estate. This is why the self-proclaimed anti-woke movement completely misses the point. They think that the use of “woke language” can somehow affect who owns the estate and who belongs to the estate. Everyone who has been subjected to acts of racism or sexism knows that, while language matters, it is not decisive in relation to the actual distribution of goods and bads. People deploying woke language—for example, virtue hoarders—can benefit just as much from their privileges as those who do not. In fact, virtue signaling is already an affirmation of privilege.
Thus, a post-apocalyptic Sociology must completely objectify the entire discursive formation of the Establishment without taking anything for granted. This puts post-apocalyptic Sociology immediately at risk of being labelled an “enemy of the state” or “an enemy within.” Of course, this would not be the first time such labels have been used. Whereas in today’s world the implicit association between Jewishness and Globalism might still be alive, the one between Jewishness and Communism is vehemently denied. But—interestingly enough—the link between Globalism and Communism (which actually makes sense, since Communism is derived from the notion of a borderless solidarity of the proletariat) is pivotal to almost all (mostly but not exclusively right-wing) nationalist sentiments. Spectres of Marx—a true hauntology—are still among us.
“We are all Palestinians” then becomes a trope in which we can sense a spectre of Marx (“proletarians of all nations, unite!”), yet this time, it is not sugar-coated in revolutionary optimism, but steeped in the grim reality of existential agony. Post-apocalyptic Sociology cannot accept the blinding side-effects of hope; there is still hope, but it has lost its optimism. Becoming-Palestinian is kenosis, and this kenosis enables us to continue to exist. This kenosis enables us to carry on without relying on either the deceptions derived from the Establishment or the violence derived from the CFWM. If Hamas has taught us anything, it is that violence is not only an accelerator of apocalypse but also an inhibition of kenosis.
I can understand why those who feel strongly about justice will condemn this kenotic anti-violence as surrender. Perhaps even a kenotic ethos will ultimately have to accommodate acts of violence in order to continue—like a parent willing to deploy it to protect their children. However, this does not justify its becoming a means to reconfigure an Establishment. A post-apocalyptic Sociology recognizes that violence happens but is not equipped—as Sociology—to judge whether violence is justified or not. A kenotic ethos suggests that, more often than not, violence cannot be justified. As a human being, however, it is somewhat easier to understand that, under specific circumstances, violence as self-defense is understandable. At the same time, relabelling attack as defense, or the use of excessive violence, cannot be justified. Of course, all violence against those who cannot defend themselves—which constitutes legal definitions of war crimes and crimes against humanity—is not merely unjustifiable; it is also deplorable.
In a post-apocalyptic world, justice is not to be expected—but thirsting for justice is. It is very difficult to observe kakistocrats getting away with legalized robbery, rape, and murder without any recourse to means of retribution. The thirst for justice increases as a result, but it must be clearly separated from the thirst for revenge. In a post-apocalyptic world, the thirst for justice can only be quenched through kenosis, which includes the ability to forgive. Violent retributions will not do justice to the suffering that has been imposed on us.
A post-apocalyptic world may need a different kind of solidarity. To speak with Durkheim, this will not be a return to mechanical solidarity, nor will it be a recalibration of organic solidarity. This new solidarity will emerge neither from affective similitude nor from abstraction. Instead, it emerges from a recognition of debt. Those who think ecologically—in terms of being part of the web of life—already recognize this debt: we exist because we have been enabled. But we own nothing of that which we “have.” We belong, but not to any specific estate.
The first thing a post-apocalyptic Sociology must recognize is that an apocalypse is not about to happen. Apocalypse—meaning revelation—only exists as that which has already happened, though we have not been able to fully come to terms with it. This is, I believe, the situation we are in right now. For those of us who have been paying attention—Chernobyl or Fukushima, 9/11 or Nakba, the credit crunch or bitcoins, global warming or Covid-19, Trump or Putin—each can be experienced as an apocalyptic trigger point. Individually, we might call each of these a disaster, but taken together, they amount to the realization that the future of the Enlightenment is already over. Its lies have been permanently and irrevocably exposed. Its ethical-ideological framework is terminally ill.
One of the most remarkable and universal features driving the post-apocalypse is arbitrariness. There is no foundational logic—only distorted manifestations of will to power. Yet it is exactly this arbitrariness that enables us to separate the thirst for revenge from the thirst for justice. The former is arbitrary; the latter is not. Hence, there is an ethical-political foundation to post-apocalyptic Sociology that unifies kenosis and pragmatics with a distinctive sociological approach.
Disaffected Sociology 
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